Effective tax rates as a determinant of foreign direct investment in Centraland East European countries. A panel analysis. The Central-and East European Countries have lowered their corporate tax rates substantially in order to induce shifts of production capacity to their countries. This paper analyses empirically how inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows channeled to these countries reacts to these tax policies. We estimate a panel of 35 bilateral country-relationships over a period of [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002]. Results suggest a semielasticity of -2.93 which is in line with results derived in studies mainly on OECD countries. This indicates that f rom an individual country perspective, tax-lowering strategies have been successful in the past, yet they may not be a successful policy option for the future when privatization-related FDI will decrease.
Introduction
Governments in Central and East European Countries (CEEC-5; see Table 1) intervene to influence the location choice of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) by various measures. They provide incentive packages, fiscal and non-fiscal, and they try to shape various location factors in order to lower production costs for foreign firms. One location factor that figures prominently in actual policy making as well as in the public debate is the corporate income tax rate. What is at issue therefore is, whether tax-rate cuts are an appropriate policy tool for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ii and whether FDI responds significantly to changes of the corporate income tax burden in the CEEC-5.
A first look at the data reveals that a close relationship between FDI and corporate income taxation is indeed plausible. First, the data show a remarkable surge of European and US direct investment into the CEEC-5 during the last years. A considerable variation over time and between host and home countries in the distribution of FDI is given (see tables 1 and 2). Source: UNCTAD database.
As expected, larger countries receive the highest FDI inflows. Yet Poland, the country with the largest population, performs only slightly better than the Czech
Republic. This manifests itself in a relatively low FDI stock per capita in Poland (not reported). Furthermore Table 1 reveals that there is a surge in FDI inflows to all of the CEEC-5 since 1995. Table 2 shows the origin of FDI stock. The three most important home countries are Germany, The Netherlands and Austria. The large share of Austria in Slovenia as well as the large shares of Germany and the Netherlands in all countries but Slovenia are striking. The data also reveal that most of the FDI stock is owned by European
Investors.
The observed surge in FDI inflow to the CEEC-5 was accompanied by a more or less pronounced drop in the overall statutory corporate income tax rates iv in most of the CEEC-5. Source: Bellak et al. (2004) factor as well as the conceptual background. Section 16.4 discusses the variables and the methodology used in the estimation. In section 16.5 the estimation results are presented and discussed, section 16.6 summarizes.
Theoretical background
The causes of FDI into a particular country have been studied extensively in the literature. It is useful to separate these causes into two distinct questions (Frenkel et al. 2004) . First, why does FDI emerge at all? Second, why does a particular country succeed in the competition for FDI?
Turning to the first question, broadly speaking two distinct motives why firms want to undertake FDI are given (Navaretti and Venables 2004) . The first motive is to supply a market directly through a subsidiary. This is termed horizontal or market-oriented FDI (HFDI). The second motive is to find low production cost locations. Despite this clear conceptual separation between HFDI and VFDI, it is difficult to separate FDI empirically. For example, a particular location may be chosen not only due to its low production costs but also for its proximity to large neighboring markets.
This introduces a horizontal motive to the -at first sight -purely vertical one (Navaretti and Venables 2004; Caves 1996) . Furthermore affiliates in the CEECs are often supplied with headquarter services from abroad (like controlling, R&D, advertising) and yet still are horizontal FDI.
Discussion of these motives for FDI per se does not give a satisfying answer to the first question raised above. An answer is provided by the OLI-paradigm (Dunning 1988; Markusen 1995 Table 4 . The selection of relevant L -advantages for an empirical analysis therefore remains a difficult issue, which can only be tackled by looking at the empirical evidence given so far.
The impact of taxation on FDI
It is difficult to come up with strong predictions about the consequences of tax-rate cuts on FDI inflows in CEEC-5. This is due to a conceptual and an empirical argument. This subsection therefore takes a brief look at earlier evidence and discusses a number of conceptual points in the remainder.
There exist only a few empirical studies, which suggest a mixed picture. These studies suggest that taxes have only a relatively low impact on FDI to CEEC-5. In Bellak et al. (2004) we survey six papers which include taxes as a determinant of FDI and find a median tax rate elasticity of -0.22. This implies that a 1 percentage point change in the tax rate will reduce FDI by 0.22 percent. This value is well below the value of -3.3 found by Ederveen (2003 and 2001) for FDI to mainly developed countries and also well below the value of -0.6 which Desai et al. (2004) suggest as a rule of thumb.
The low semi -elasticity of -0.22 may be explained by the following facts, which are partly transition-specific:
• Tax-cutting strategies of governments may have little impact on FDI, since FDI may reflect strategic decisions by the management and are thus only partly cost-driven in the short run (compared to portfolio investment which reacts more directly to changes in profitability).
• As far as FDI -flows contribute to expansionary investm ent, it may react less than in the case of new investment, Greenfield investment in particular.
• Given the large number of location factors stated to be relevant for location decisions by firms themselves, taxes may well have a lower relative weight than other location factors.
• Also, the possibility for transfer pricing may turn the tax burden for MNEs ceteris paribus in a non-issue.
• But the validity of this relatively low value is also questionable from a conceptual point of view as most of the papers surve yed use the statutory corporate income tax rates as measure of tax burden in the host countries instead of the for FDI better suited (forward looking) bilateral effective average tax rates. Using the statutory tax rate of the host country may therefore res ult in a sort of measurement error bias in the estimated tax rate elasticities as the BEATRs differ in level and variability from the statutory corporate income tax rates (see Bellak et al. (2004) for details).
It therefore remains mainly an empirical question to determine the role of the tax burden for FDI for particular countries and particular time periods and thus raises interesting methodological issues. This study adds to the literature by considering the tax burden as a determinant of FDI in general, and more importantly by using
BEATRs instead of the statutory corporate income tax rates as measure of tax burden.
Variables, Data and Methodology

Dependent Variable
Net-bilateral-FDI-outflow-to-GDP-ratio from home country (i) to host country (j) fo r the we do not use a logarithmic specification, but we normalize bilateral FDI flows by the host country GDP in order to reduce existing heterogeneity between country-pairs in FDI flows.
Independent Variables
As we are entirely concerned with the second question raised above (where to locate?) our independent variables have to be valid proxies for host country-related L advantages. We base our choice of independent variables upon the findings of some recent and/or widely cited studies. viii Specifically, we use as right-hand-side variables proxies for the L-factor taxation, which is our variable of main interest and we control for other important location factors.
(a) Taxation (eatr)
In Bellak et al. (2004) we argue that from a conceptual and empirical point of view
forward looking effective tax rates should be used for assessing the role of corporate income taxation on FDI. More precisely, we argue that for location decision of MNEs forward-looking, cross border (bilateral) effective average tax rates (BEATR) should be used. Devereux and Griffith (1999) . For further details concerning assumptions and the calculation, see the appendix and Bellak et al. 2004 . We expect a negative sign of the estimated coefficient. Distance is an important determinant of FDI (Brainard 1997) . It is especially relevant for production FDI where economies of scale on the plant level at the affiliate have to be weighed against the costs of exporting. This measure has been frequently used in gravity-type models as well as in specifications in empirical studies explaining FDI.
The expected sign of the estimated coefficient is ambiguous a priori. While large distance may encourage FDI due to an I -advantage it also may discourage it due to the lack of market know-how, higher communication and information costs and differences in culture and institutions 2005; Buch and Lipponer 2004) .
(e) Home -country population (pophmio)
In order to account for size differences of the home countries, we include population of the home (in mn) countries as a control variable. Since the outward investment potential of larger countries is higher than that of smaller countries, home-country size is expected to be positively related to inward FDI in the host country.
ix (f) Tariffs (tar)
Tariff is the ratio of tariffs on imports over imports of goods and services. From a theoretical point of view the sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori ambiguous depending upon the underlying motive for FDI. If the observed FDI is mainly HFDI then the market imperfection theory of FDI suggests a positive sign.
High trade costs may encourage HFDI because servicing more distant markets via exports is more expensive, not least due to transport cos ts. In this case HFDI is observed due to an internalization advantage (tariff-jumping FDI). On the other hand if FDI is mainly VFDI then theory suggests a negative sign (Frenkel et al. 2004; Navaretti and Venables 2004) . In the case of VFDI high trade costs can be seen as a location-disadvantage, which deters FDI. For the CEECs we emphasize the tariffjumping hypothesis, which refers to final-goods production to supply the host -country market. Yet, this reasoning suggests a positive relationship between trade costs and FDI is not relevant here, since trade costs have been lowered substantially in absolute terms during the last years, especially vis-à-vis the EU. Rather, we expect a negative relationship between trade costs and FDI flows, i.e. the lower the t ariffs on imports, the higher the incentive to undertake FDI with a high input share supplied mostly by the parent company from abroad.
(g) Risk (risk)
In countries in transition, where not only economic, but also political turmoil may arise, political risk may play a role as a determinant of FDI, too. We expect a negative relationship (a positive coefficient) between risk and FDI.
(h) Inflation (infl)
The sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand it may have a negative impact upon FDI due to the macroeconomic instabilities high inflation rates imply (Buch and Lipponer 2004) . On the other hand it may have positive effects for example via exchange rate changes: An appreciation of the home country's currency alters the price for acquiring assets in the host country and it may lead to a substitution of exports for foreign production. For our sample it is important to note that inflation has been brought down substantially compared to the early transition period. Hence it may no longer impact (negatively) upon FDI.
Methodology
Our data set constitutes a panel of seven home countries (i), five host countries (j) and seven years (t). The estimated model is generally specified as follows:
(FDI/GDP) ijt is the FDI to GDP ratio and X ijt , W jt and Z it are (1 x k l , l = 1,2,3 ) vectors of right-hand side variables described above. All of the right hand side variables except eatr, dist, popmio and pophmio are measured in levels. The eatr is used in log-form to allow for possible non-linearities. More specifically, the log -form implies that the higher the eatr-level, the higher the absolute change in eatr for a given change in the dependent variable needs to be. Mátyás 1997; Frenkel et al. 2004 ). e ijt is the remainder error term.
The model is estimated by pooled OLS. In a first round of specification search severe outliers are detected by using common descriptive statistics (studentized residuals, Cook's Distance) and added variable plots. Ten data points are detected as severe (2000), AUT-SK (2001) ). These data points make up about four percent of our sample and are dropped from the analysis.
outliers (GER-SK (2002), GER-SK (2000), GER-HU (1998), GER-CZ (2002), US-SK (2001), US-HU (2000), UK -HU (1999), FR-SK (2002), FR-PL
In a second round we estimate various models starting from one which includes all of the variables described above. 
Results
Our final specification includes lneatr, share, lnpopmio, lndist and a full set of home country dummies as regressors. (10; 224) 12.85*** Arellano-Bond-Test AR (1) 2.92*** Arellano-Bond-Test AR (2) 2.02** Arellano-Bond-Test AR (3) 0.87 Breusch-Pagan-Test 87.07*** Note: t-values in parenthesis */**/*** denote significance at the 90/95/99% confidence level Home country fixed effects included and significant. Host country and time fixed effects are not significant. Risk , tar, infl and lnpophmio are not significant. Table 9 shows that controlling for major determinants of FDI flows tax rate reductions had a statistically significant impact on the FDI/GDP-ratio in the past. From a more substantive point of view the coefficient (REM) on lneatr of -0.330 implies that a one percent decrease in the eatr increases the FDI/GDP-ratio by 0.0033 percentage points. Evaluated at the overall averaged FDI/GDP ratio (about 0.356%; see table 7) and the overall averaged GDP (about EUR 63010.5 mn, see table 8), a one percent reduction of the tax rate ceteris paribus would lead to an increase of FDI inflows of about EUR 2.10 mn on average. From the coefficient on lneatr a tax-rate elasticity (semi-elasticity) of about -2.93 (evaluated at the overall averaged mean FDI/GDPratio and eatr) is derived. Given the overall averaged mean eatr of about 31.65 percent (see table 8) the semi-elasticity implies that a decrease of the eatr to 30.65 percent would increase FDI inflows by EUR 6.7 mn. The semi-elasticity of -2.93 is substantially larger than the median semi-elasticity of -0.22 surveyed by Bellak et al. (2004) and it is much more in line with the results derived by DeMooij and Ederveen table 16 .7). The insignificance of infl is in line with other studies (e.g. Frenkel et al. 2004 ). Moreover inflation has been brought down considerably in the host countries considered here. Hence the insignificance of inflation seems to be a plausible result.
Finally, standardized coefficients (not shown) suggest that dist is the most important determinant of FDI in our specification. From a policy perspective perhaps more interesting is that taxation (eatr: beta = -0.189) exerts a slightly stronger impact upon FDI than the privatization process (share: beta = +0.135).
Summary
During the past few years lowering the corporate tax rate was seen as a key policy instrument to attract FDI of foreign MNEs in CEEC-5. Tax rates are an attractive policy tool for policy-makers, because they can easily be changed and are thought to affect the behavior of economic agents immediately. This chapter investigates whether there is indeed a significant relationship between corporate taxation and FDI empirically. Our empirical study, which is based on a panel data set includes the bilateral effective tax rates (BEATRs) instead of the statutory tax rate and as controls mainly variables which i ntend to capture the differences in L-advantages of the CEEC-5.
Contrary to earlier evidence which suggests a minor role of taxes for FDI in the CEECs, our regression analysis of FDI flows into five East European host countries from their seven most important home countries confirms the importance of the taxrate as a determinant. The deduced tax-rate elasticity is about -2.93. This result is, inter alia a consequence of replacing the statutory tax rate in the estimation by a more appropriate measure, namely the BEATR.
Hence, f rom an individual country perspective, tax-lowering strategies have been successful in attracting FDI in the past. Yet we doubt that the results of our analysis provide a good guidance for future policy strategies (i.e. further tax-rate cuts) in the CEECs, as created assets such as high quality public infra structure certainly will become more decisive location factors, particularly if these countries are to profit more from headquarter services, R&D activites etc. of foreign MNEs. • eatr
The average effective tax rate is calculated using the Devereux-Griffiths (1999) methodology, based on the following assumptions and parameters: § 3 different assets (machinery, building and inventory in the manufacturing sector) § 7 ways of financing a cross border investment of 1 with a pre-tax financial return of 20: (i) retained earnings subsidiary; (ii) new equity subsidiary and retained earnings parent; (iii) debt subsidiary and retained earnings parent; (iv) new equity subsidiary and new equity parent; (v) debt subsidiary and debt parent; (vi) new equity subsidiary and debt parent; (vii) debt subsidiary and new equity parent. § economic depreciation rates of the various assets: 3.61% for buildings, 12.25% for machinery, 0 for inventory § nominal interest rate of 7.625% § common inflation rate of 2.5% § constant nominal exchange rate § a weighted average structure of assets (buildings / machinery / inventory) of 55 / 35 / 10 § a weighted average structure across the various types of financing (retained earnings / equity / debt): 55 / 10 / 35 for parent and 1/3 / 1/3 / 1/3 for subsidiary Our assumptions about the asset structure differ from those of other studies, which mainly follow OECD (1991), because data on inventories in the CEE-NMS show that they are far less important than they have been within the OECD as reported in 1991.
Instead we assign a higher weight to investment in buildings. Note als o that we do not include any tax incentives in our measure since the choice of relevant incentives in each home and host country would be arbitrary. eatr is measured in percent.
• share This variable is taken from various issues of the Transition Report published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is measured in percent.
• dist Distance is defined as the geographical distance between the capital cities of the home and the host country in kilometers. Data are taken from various internet sources.
• pophmio
Home-country population is defined as total population (in mn) of the seven home countries. Data are taken from the WDI database and from Eurostat.
• popmio
Host-country population is defined as the total population (in mn) of the five host countries. Data are taken from Eurostat. § risk Risk data come from various issues of "Euromoney". 100 is the maximum value (lowest possible risk level) and zero the minimum value (highest possible risk value).
To obtain the overall country risk score, Euromoney assigns a weighting to nine categories. These are political risk (25% weight), economic performance (25%), debt indicators (10%), Debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), access to short-term finance (5%), access to capital markets (5%), forfaiting (5%). § infl As a proxy for inflation the GDP-deflator of each host country is used, taken from the AMECO database. § tar tar is defined as the ratio of "tariffs on imports" (from Eurostat, Main National Accounts, Position D212: "taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT", position S13:
General Government) over "imports of goods and services", taken from the European Commission's AMECO database. ii From now on, it is convenient to use the term FDI for the location choice of MNEs, it being understood that FDI is an operationalisation for the "activity of MNEs in the host country".
iii AUT = Austria, GER = Germany, FR = France, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
iv "Overall" means that local business taxes are included.
v The overall tax rate for not distributed profits is shown.
vi The analysis starts with the year 1996 due to the deep recession in the CEEC up to 1995 and ends with the year 2002 due to restrictions in data availability.
vii A detailed data description can be found in the Appendix.
viii In particular we base our choice upon following papers: Navaretti and Venables 2004, Carstensen and Frenkel et al. 2004; Desai et al 2004; Holland and Pain 1998. 
